The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 72 | Number 3

Article 9

8-1-2005

[Book Review of] Moral Acquaintances:
Methodology in Bioethics, by Kevin Wm. Wildes
Janet Smith

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Medicine and Health Sciences
Commons
Recommended Citation
Smith, Janet (2005) "[Book Review of] Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics, by Kevin Wm. Wildes," The Linacre Quarterly:
Vol. 72 : No. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol72/iss3/9

Book Review
Moral Acquaintances: Methodology in Bioethics, by Kevin Wm. Wildes,
SJ, Notre Dame Indiana, 2000, 214 pp.
The field of bioethics amply illustrates that morally, ours is a pluralistic
culture. Kevin Wm. Wildes, SJ., in his book Moral Acquaintances:
Methodology in Bioethics undertakes to assess the strengths and limitations
of the reigning methods of bioethics and to propose methods that will
enable bioethics to operate better in our pluralistic times, methods based on
the concept of moral acquaintanceship, a concept that attempts to build on
values or principles opposing theories might hold in common.
It is not until very late into the book that Wildes makes explicit his
understanding of bioethics. It is: "a discipline that resolves moral
controversies in medical research, experimentation, clinical treatment, and
health care policy. As a field of inquiry seeking to resolve moral
controversies, bioethics has sought agreement or consensus with a zeal
reminiscent of the knights' search for the lost chalice. Each method in
bioethics attempts to establish as much agreement as possible, and
different methods legitimate themselves, in part, by their ability to
articulate agreement." Had this definition appeared earlier in the book, it
would have saved some readers much frustration and confusion, that is,
those who operate with the understanding that bioethics is a subdiscipline
of ethics, that it is the attempt to discem what is the moral action in a given
situation (in the health care arena) and what reasons justify that action.
This definition explains the curious categories Wild~ uses to evaluate
valious theories; that is, for instance, he regularly faults an ethical system,
here called a method, for not achieving a consensus in a pluralistic culture.
The terms of evaluation employed by Wildes suggest that "truth" is
not a comfortable category for him. In fact, "true" and "false" or "moral"
and "immoral" or "good" and "evil" or "light" and "wrong" are words that
rarely appear in Wildes' discourse and when they do they are regularly
placed in quotation marks. His discourse is full of talk about methods that
are "appealing" or "attractive", about choices that are "appropriate" or
"inappropriate", about methods that have "strengths" and "weaknesses."
Wildes' choices for representatives of various theories/methods
are interesting. Books on bioethics regularly review the philosophic
options: utilitarianism, deontology, principlism, natural law, virtue based
ethics, feminist care ethics, and casuistry are generally the primary players.
Peter Singer is Wildes' utilitarian, Alan Donagan his deontologist, Grisez/
BoylelFinnis/May his natural law theorists and Pellegrino and Thomasma
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his virtue theory ethicists. To be sure, there is something refreshing about
these substitutions for Mill, Kant, Thomas, and Aristotle, but one would
think he would give a nod to those whom to date have been enshrined as
standard place holders by the bioethical establishment.
Indeed, although Wildes ' choices are refreshing, one wonders if they
are altogether appropriate. (The pluralism is much greater of course than
this list indicates; it celtainly pays little heed to various religious
commitments nor to the fact that rarely could or would a physician or
patient identify himself or herself as one of these. So one may doubt the
"real-life" relevance of these philosophic inventories.) The field of
bioethics tends to consider as a deontologist anyone who thinks that there
are intrinsic evils: Kant, the original and premier deontologist, reasoned
only in terms of absolute, universal evils, but many of those deemed
deontologists, such as some Christians, acknowledge only a few intrinsic
evils. Rights theorists, too, seem to have some absolutes, but does this
make them deontologists? The late Donagan is more of a deontologist than
many who are identified as such but I am not aware that he published on
bioethical issues or that his "method" is used to address bioethical
problems.
Wildes' choice of representative thinkers in the natural law tradition
is also suspect; regrettably, in my view, Grisez/BoylelFinnis/May have
come to occupy primacy of place in many surveys as modem natural law
theorists although they are fierce opponents of the AristotelianlThomistic
natural law theory that has informed much of Catholic ethics, the home of
natural law ethics. Wildes asserts that their natural law theory is based on
"self-evident" basic goods and counts it as the third of three Roman
Catholic natural law traditions. The physicalist natural law of the tradition
is said to have framed the Church's teaching on sexual ' matters and its
representative proponent is Pope Pius XI and his condemnation of
contraception. (I wonder why Pope Paul VI escaped censure.) He
mentions in passing that there is a "person-centered" natural law tradition,
represented by Joseph Fuchs, SJ., that "takes into account the
psychological aspects of human nature." (One suspects he approves this
method, for after all, it makes room for contraception.) No mention is
made of Pope John Paul II's personalism, a version of natural law that
focuses on the person and that upholds the condemnation of contraception.
I chose Wildes' book as a textbook for a graduate course in bioethics
since Wildes exhibits a suitable familiarity with the various reigning
theories in bioethics and 1 was interested in his focus on the problems
bioethics faces in a pluralistic culture. Yet this book proved to be
immensely disappointing as an exhibit of philosophic thinking.
Wildes makes abundant distinctions in his book, not all of them of
sufficient clarity. Indeed, it is no small deficiency in his methodology that
August, 2005
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the word "method" itself is left undefined; it is helpful that he equates it
with proceduralism and likens methodology to the "rules of a game", yet
his willingness to nearly identify theories with methods left my graduate
students and myself confused about his precise meaning (more about this
below).
The most significant deficiency of the work is that Wildes does not
systematically identify the criteria by which he evaluates different
"methods", nor attempts to justify his criteria. While Wildes constantly
asserts that thinkers are often not self-conscious enough about the
assumptions that undergird and form their thought and criticizes various
theories for not sufficiently justifying their governing principles, he
exhibits no awareness that his enterprise is lacking the same self-conscious
awareness of fundamental commitments and is without explicit
justification. The desire to find some "trans-theory" methodes), some
bioethical methodes) that will suit a pluralistic culture, is itself, of course,
based on some assumptions of what is good; assumptions Wildes does not
identify or justify until very late in the book and then inadequately. In fact,
it is not clear whether Wildes thinks pluralism in itself is a problem or a
benefit or both or what criteria would help us decide. It is clear that Wildes
thinks that working in communities is better than not and that coming to a
consensus is valuable (for methods that help communities operate and
build consensus are deemed appealing) but he does tell us why he thinks
so, beyond saying that it is obvious and he intuits it to be such (125).
Certainly, one's philosophic commitments would determine what
value one would find in "pluralism", how important it would be to
accommodate one's method to pluralism, the way in which one would
operate in a pluralistic culture; that is, one supposes that a utilitarian,
deontologist, principlist, natural law ethicist, virtue ba~ed ethicist, feminist
care ethicist, and casuist would all have different assessments of
"pluralism", its problems and benefits, and would have different proposals
how to live morally in pluralistic cultures (I would find very useful a
volume with essays by each on the question of pluralism). Much of what
Wildes says indicates that he does not think there is some detached position
from which one can view pluralism and resolve what "problem" it may
present or take advantage of what "benefit" might be associated with it, but
his practice of proceeding without identifying and justifying his own
philosophical commitments conflicts with his insistence that others be selfconscious about theirs.
His assessment of natural law theories is typical:
Natural law approaches have at least two elements which make them
attractivc. First they assume that moral knowledge (principles) can be
apprehended by reason. If the project succeeds there would be a way
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by which moral agents, from different cultures, would be bound
together. Second, they take seriously the pluralism of moral reasons
by trying to include a variety of arguments (deontological,
teleological). (38)

Wildes gives no indication of how "theory-bound" his evaluations
are; that is, he never tells us why a theory is more attractive because it binds
cultures together. He praises theories and methods for features they may
not value in the same way. Certainly, the commitment of natural law to
reason is not because of its "bonding" powers (though that is a benefit), but
is based on a view of man as a rational animal and of action in accord with
one's nature as a good, an understanding that natural law theorists think is
an objective truth accessible to humans everywhere. Furthermore, natural
law's incorporation of a "variety of arguments" is not based on a desire to
be pluralistic, but is considered necessary because of the nature of reality.
The assessment of the strengths and limitations of various theories/
methods occupies the first part of Wildes' book. Again, I find his close
association with theory and method to be problematic. In Wildes' view,
utilitarianism, deontology, natural law, and virtue ethics are all theories and
methods as well - in fact, they are all methods of fundamentally the same
kind, that is, foundationalism . Foundational theories posit some universal
principle and then try to determine the morality of particular acts by
applying the universal to the particular. In general, Wildes finds such
theories/methods likely incompatible with bioethics, since bioethics is so
much about the particular; he finds universals rather without "content" and
when such theories do provide content, that makes them less useful in a
pluralistic culture. There is only some slight suggestion that he
understands how ironic it is to critique a system for not hav\,ug content and
then finding it useless when it does provide content (and not because one
finds the content wrong.)
While it might be true for some theories that posit "universals" that
the content is "thin", it is not true of all. For instance, Wildes faults an
ethics that begins with the principle "Do good, avoid evil" as "not very
helpful" since it does not tell us "what good should be done or what evil
avoided." Now the one theory I know that "begins" with that very principle
(Thomism), is not unclear on what is good and what is evil; what is good is
what is in accord with human nature and what is evil is what violates
human nature. Nor are adherents kept in the dark about what human nature
is. While Wildes occasionally acknowledges that various ethical systems
involve various metaphysical and epistemological "assumptions" and
commitments, he rarely acknowledges that sometimes these are fully
developed, acknowledged, and incorporated into an ethical theory and that
they are essential to the content of the theory.
August, 2005
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Moreover, Wildes does not acknowledge that there may be some
difficulty if not injustice in assessing theories/methods for their utility in
dealing with the problems of a pluralistic culture if they were not devised
with that purpose in mind. In my understanding, ethical theories rarely
were devised with the intent of providing a method for decision-making,
rather they provide a means for explaining why such actions as adultery are
wrong. In general, they might assist one in justifying the decisions one
makes should the need arise more than in guiding one in making decisions.
Mill, for instance, explicitly denied that utilitarians would customarily use
the utility principle to guide their choices; rather they would be using the
wisdom of their tradition (wise because it is based on the utility principle).
A natural law theorist might employ the ten commandments and never
make explicit reference to "do good, avoid evil" or "act in accord with
nature." Again, for instance, Aristotle thought one would avoid
committing adultery because one had been habituated well; his ethical
theory largely explained why habituation was necessary for good ethical
behavior. What he was seeking was the truth about what is the end of
human action and what action advances that end and what action deflects
from that end. He did not articulate any "method" for making ethical
decisions.
Wildes realizes that his discovery of fatal flaws in all theories/
methods and his abandonment of the attempt to find some "content" full
ethics that would win our allegiance, may suggest that all that is left is
relativism. But Wildes is a fierce opponent of relativism, not, though,
because it is false. His definition of relativism is strange: "The relativist
view is that it really does not matter which position one holds on any
matter." (146) (Another possible definition is, of course, that it does make
a difference what position one holds, but the criteria are relative to a certain
culture.). Wildes finds "a problem with [the indifferentism that follows
upon relativism] is that if one holds it, he or she will have no incentive to
reach a consensus with anyone who holds different views." (146)
Wildes prefers "communitarian" ethics and the extent of his
justification for that preference seems to be that "no human being exists
alone;" (125) he certainly makes no claim that truth is better achieved
through community. He also lauds the "postmodern" insight that the
"focus falls more on the particular, and the local than on the universal and
the necessary. In a secular society that is multicultural and morally
pluralistic no single communitarian bioethics method is possible."
In the final pages of the book, Wildes provides a fairly skimpy
presentation of how he thinks the concept of moral acquaintanceship can
help solve the problems of bioethics. Moral acquaintances have something
in common: values, paradigmatic cases, principles, for instance. When
two bioethicists meet, one of their major concerns should be attempting to
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discern what they may have in common, for these may become building
blocks for further agreement. For Wildes this is an advance beyond
Englehardt's moral strangers who rely only upon a rule-laden
proceduralism that Wildes finds too thin since it has so little content.
Wildes advocates a proceduralism among moral acquaintances in a
secular pluralistic society that is based upon four elements: 1) a
commitment to liberty; 2) recourse to the law to set limits; 3) a recognition
of the limits of authority and 4) toleration of differences. This is just about
the totality of his description of his proposal for proceduralism based on
moral acquaintanceship; no examples are given of what procedures might
bring about consensus. I find this description not only content thin but
"rule" thin.
Wildes puts his cliteria to test in respect to two issues that greatly test
bioethics' desire to achieve consensus: abortion and assisted suicide.
Wildes' method seems to fail completely in respect to abortion since he
makes no judgment at all about it; he simply has recourse to his
characteristic practice of positing a series of questions that an issue raises.
Conversely, he is surprisingly crystal clear on what his proceduralism
yields in respect to assisted suicide: "I find no general, secular moral
argument that can justify the state's prohibition of assisted suicide.
Arguments against suicide are unavoidably based in particular views of the
good life and the good death." This point is highly debatable and deserves
some debate. Certainly I share the assessment that ours is a pluralistic
culture but I am less convinced that it is thoroughly secular. In this
pluralistic culture forty-nine states still have laws against assisted suicide
(laws arguably reflecting an earlier common morality), laws largely
observed, and some of them have been recently reaffirmed in the face of
movements for revision.
Wildes' clarity on assisted suicide leads one to wonder if he is an
advocate of assisted suicide. For one could well imagine that the opponent
of assisted suicide, one who wishes to promote the culture of life, might
find the presence of these laws on the books a basis on which to attempt to
reconstruct the common morality once in place. Wildes, however, never
explores how a common morality might be achieved; he explores only how
to live in a pluralistic culture. His project does not seem to advocate that
bioethicists debate or discuss their differences or that they attempt to
persuade each other of the truth of their respective positions or that they
attempt to find the ground of disagreement between different theories/
methods as contributing to the effort to "do" bioethics in a pluralistic
culture. He promotes only the effort to find common ground.
Wildes becomes quite innovative at one point and makes the only
specific proposal of the book. He floats the idea that a "voucher" system for
health care may be good for a pluralistic society. One individual might use his
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vouchers to prolong life; another to visit Kevorkian's clinic. Such proposals
might work for adherents to ethical systems who only want to be left alone to
pursue their own moral course. But for those who labor under the impression
that they are their brother's keeper, such a laissez-faire attitude towards the
wrong-doing of others will not be so attractive.
Let me stress again that Wildes never speaks of efforts to persuade
others of one's point of view, of the desire one might have to prevent
others, if only by persuasion, from doing something evil, of trying to help
others save their own souls by discerning God's will better. He seems to
think that everyone shares his passion that consensus should be a dominant
value and, indeed, the goal of bioethics. There is little in this book that
could be of help to opponents of the Culture of Death, those who believe
Christ's command that the Church must be a "sign of contradiction" to the
point of martyrdom.
Reviewed by
Dr. Janet Smith
Sacred Heart Major Seminary
Detroit, MI 48206
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